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ONE DOLLAR PER DAY: A NOTE ON RECENT
FORCED LABOR AND DOLLAR-PER-DAY
WAGES IN PRIVATE PRISONS HOLDING
PEOPLE UNDER IMMIGRATION LAW†
Jacqueline Stevens
ABSTRACT
In 2015, nine plaintiffs in Denver, Colorado filed a lawsuit in federal court
against The GEO Group, Inc. (“GEO”), alleging that the work they performed
for GEO, while detained under immigration laws, violated Colorado’s MinimumWage Order (CMWO), the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s (TVPA)
prohibition against forced labor, and Colorado common law barring unjust
enrichment. In the wake of the federal district court allowing two out of the three
charges to be heard by juries, as well as granting class certification, additional
lawsuits against GEO and the prison firm CoreCivic were filed in California and
Washington.
To assist scholars and practitioners in staying abreast of novel and fastemerging developments, this Article provides key excerpts and analysis from
recent filings in five cases: Menocal v. The GEO Group (2015), Owino v.
CoreCivic (2017), State of Washington v. The GEO Group (2017), Chao
Chen v. The GEO Group (2017), and Novoa v. The GEO Group (2017).
I. INTRODUCTION
As prisons supplanted corporal punishment in England and the
colonies in the sixteenth century, the forced labor of those punished by
incarceration was justified by a variety of political, economic, and
religious or other supposedly moral rationales.1 Emerging in a legal space
*
Professor, Department of Political Science, Director, Deportation Research Clinic,
Buffett Institute for Global Justice, Northwestern University
†
Thanks to Haley Hopkins for her research assistance, as well as to Charles Clarke for
manuscript preparation. Thanks also to attorney Andrew Free for representing me in
ongoing litigation under the Freedom of Information Act to compel the federal government
to release documents controlled by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on the
management of private prisons. To follow updated motions in litigation discussed in this
Article, see http://deportationresearchclinic.org/DRC-INS-ICE-FacilityContracts-Reports.
html [https://perma.cc/Z4JW-CX29].
1
See Ryan Marion, Prisoners for Sale: Making the Thirteenth Amendment Case against State
Private Prison Contracts, 18 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 213, 217 n.36 (2009) (“[c]onsidered a
major reform in punishment at the time, the Walnut Street Prison required its inmates to
work ‘in order to attack idleness, though to be a major cause of crime’”) (citing Stephen
Garvey, Freeing Prisoners’ Labor, 50 STAN. L. REV. 339, 348 (1998) and quoting William
Quigley, Prison Work, Wages, and Catholic Social Thought: Justice Demands Decent Work for
Decent Wages, Even for Prisoners, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1159, 1161–62 (2004) (“[t]he focus
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specifically designated as distinct from penal institutions, the labor of
those in custody under immigration laws also has received attention since
its inception.2 Indeed the Supreme Court’s famous 1896 decision
prohibiting punitive measures based on civil immigration laws responded
in particular to an 1892 statute requiring that any person of Chinese origin
or descent found illegally in the United States “be imprisoned at hard
labor for a period not exceeding one year, and thereafter removed from
the United States.”3 The Court found the requirement of hard labor
“inflicts an infamous punishment” in violation of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.4 In the decades following the ruling, Congress and the
agencies overseeing the housing of people under immigration laws were
mindful of this prohibition and ensured that no one in custody under
immigration laws would be forced to work. 5
Having attempted to distinguish certain consequences of detention
under immigration law from criminal custody, Congress continued to
pass legislation providing few legal protections to those in deportation
proceedings.6 In the 1952 Immigration and Naturalization Act, which
remains the basis for much of the current U.S. Code governing detention
authority under immigration laws, Congress specified that the
Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) had authority to detain people
under immigration laws without using hearings specified by the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) of 1946.7 This portion of the statute
was written to respond to a 1950 Supreme Court opinion affirming a
habeas petition based on the absence of due process in deportation

was primarily on the moral rehabilitation of the prisoner and only secondarily on the idea of
having prison work defray some of the costs of incarceration”)).
2
See infra Part II (showing the legal growth around and examination of immigration laws
about detained immigrants and using said individuals for labor).
3
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 976 (1896).
4
Id.
5
See Jacqueline Stevens, One Dollar Per Day: The Slaving Wages of Immigration Jail, from
1943 to Present, GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 391, 398 (2015) (examining the history and actions of using
immigrants for work while they are being held for the benefits of government purposes, and
using plain text statutory construction to argue that those in custody under immigration laws
meet the definition of “employees” in federal law entitled to the protections of worker wage
and safety laws). See also S.H. Garfinkel, The Voluntary Work Program: Expanding Labor Laws
to Protect Detained Immigrant Workers, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1287, 1291–92 (2017) (analyzing
the voluntary work program for those detained under immigration laws); Anita Sinha,
Slavery by Another Name: “Voluntary” Immigrant Detainee Labor and the Thirteenth Amendment,
11 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 1 (2015) (depicting how the work programs in immigration
detention facilities violate constitutional rights).
6
See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414 (presenting
legislation about immigration law and how immigrants are held in criminal custody).
7
See id. (discussing the detaining of immigrants without hearings when they are taken
into custody by the government).
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proceedings.8 Wong Yang Sung held that the recently passed APA had as
its purpose to “curtail and change practices of embodying in one person
or agency the duties of prosecutor and judge” and found that the APA,
indeed applied to the deportation proceedings of the U.S. Immigration
Service.9 The Court concluded by granting the writ of habeas corpus and
releasing the prisoner, because the deportation proceedings did not
conform to the requirements of the APA. 10
In Marcello, six members of the Court, in a brief paragraph, found that
the immigration hearing procedures exemplified due process because
many decisions were reviewable in Article III courts and noted the
“special considerations applicable to deportation which the Congress may
take into account in exercising its particularly broad discretion in
immigration matters.”11
The current litigation on behalf of respondents in ICE custody, who
are forced to work for one to three dollars per day or to avoid solitary
confinement or other punishment, occurs in the policy context of these
earlier laws, but in an operational context that is vastly different. 12 The
purpose of this Article is to apprise interested students, scholars, and
practitioners of the most recent court filings from litigation challenging
the work policies of private prisons owned and operated by The GEO
Group and CoreCivic (previously “Corrections Corporation of America”
and hereinafter CCA) in Colorado, California, and Washington State. 13

8
See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 445, 455 (1950) (sustaining the writ of habeas
corpus based on the absence of due process in deportation proceedings).
9
Id. at 445, 454.
10
See id. at 455; Marcello v. Bonds, Officer in Charge, Immigration and Naturalization
Service 349 U.S. 302, 308–09 (1955) (finding that the plain text and legislative history of
section 242(b) of the INA established that Congress intended to exclude deportation hearings
from the APA requirements and instead create “a specialized administrative procedure
applicable to deportation hearings”).
11
Id. at 311.
12
See Order Granting Motion for Class Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) & Appointment
of Class Counsel under Rule 23(g) at 2, Menocal v. GEO Corp., No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK (D.
Colo. Feb. 2, 2017) (describing the current litigation in Menocal v. GEO Corp).
13
See id. at 2, 8. See also Complaint with Jury Demand at 4, Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc., No.
3:17-cv-1112-JLS-NLS (S.D. Cal. May 31, 2017) (alleging CoreCivic unlawfully forced
detainees to operate their detention facilities); Complaint at 1–2, Washington v. GEO Corp.,
No. 17-2-11422-2 (Super. Ct. Wash. Sept. 20, 2017) (challenging GEO Corp.’s disregard of
Washington’s minimum wage laws); Class Action Complaint for Damages at 2, Chao Chen
v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-05769 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 26, 2017) (asserting that GEO violated
Washington’s minimum wage laws by only paying detainees one dollar per day).
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II. CASES
Key excerpts from motions and orders are offered to provide a brief
and specific review of the competing arguments, with examples chosen
from selected briefs to avoid duplication of arguments and precedents
cited. All of these cases are at the pleading stage, though discovery has
begun in Menocal.14
A. Alejandro Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc., case no. 1:14-cv-02887, U.S.
District Court, Colorado. Filed 10/22/2014.
1.

Class Action Complaint For Unpaid Wages and Forced Labor,
Document 1, Filed 10/22/2014

The Class Action Complaint against The GEO Group, Inc., a private
prison firm,15 sought to compel the private prison to pay compensatory
and punitive damages for unpaid wages and forced labor at its Aurora,
Colorado facility.16 The motion asserted that the facts common to the
plaintiffs arose from their shared status as employees of GEO in whose
Aurora facility they scraped and scrubbed toilets, bathrooms, showers,
windows, medical facilities, patient rooms, and medical offices. 17 They
also washed laundry for ICE residents, served meals, cut hair, prepared
clothes for those arriving, prepared meals for law enforcement officials at
GEO-sponsored events, completed office work for GEO, managed the law
library, cleaned the solitary confinement and intake areas, deep-cleaned
and readied empty areas of the facility for incoming detainees, cleaned the
warehouse, maintained the facility’s exterior, and landscaped the
surrounding grounds.18
Plaintiffs alleged that GEO’s practices constituted three violations of
Colorado or federal law. First, plaintiffs argued that GEO violated the
Colorado Minimum Wage Order (CMWO), which requires employers pay
their employees at an hourly rate equal to or greater than the statutory
minimum wage.19 Second, the Complaint highlighted GEO’s practice of
compelling six randomly-selected detainees from each pod to clean their
See Menocal, No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK (certifying the detainees as a class against GEO).
See GEO Group, Inc. Form 10–Q Filing, (June 30, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/923796/000119312517249967/d423976d10q.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZYV8A3Q9] (showing that GEO Group, Inc. is a private company that runs prisons).
16
See Class Action Complaint for Unpaid Wages and Forced Labor at 4, Menocal v. GEO
Grp., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-02887 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2014) (requesting damages and restitution for
GEO’s unlawful employment of detainees for no pay or the nominal amount of one dollar).
17
Id.
18
Id. at 2–3.
19
Id. at 3.
14
15
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pod each day in violation of the federal prohibition against forced labor
under the TVPA.20 Third, plaintiffs claimed that GEO’s dollar-per-day
pay policies “violate principles of justice, equity, and good conscience”
thereby transgressing the Colorado common-law doctrine barring unjust
enrichment.21 Judge John L. Kane denied GEO’s motion to dismiss the
federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) claim and the commonlaw unjust enrichment claim, although he affirmed the motion to dismiss
the CMWO claim.22
III. CMWO
Judge Kane’s order denying GEO’s motion to dismiss cites the
CMWO’s definition of an “employee” as any “person performing labor or
services for the benefit of an employer in which the employer may
command when, where, and how much labor or services shall be
performed.”23 But Judge Kane also acknowledged GEO’s claims that
“prisoners” should not count as “employees” for purposes of analysis
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) nor, by analogy, should
anyone working in government custody be treated as an “employee”
under the CMWO.24 The order continues:
Defendants also cite a March 31, 2012 Advisory Bulletin
from the Colorado Department of Labor (CDOL), which
finds that inmates and prisoners are exempt from the
CMWO and ‘are not employees according to Colorado
law.’ Plaintiffs respond that the Advisory Bulletin does
not apply because plaintiffs are civil immigration
detainees in a private detention facility, and not prisoners
in government custody. Defendant also argues that the
reasoning applied in Alvarado to conclude that prisoners
are not employees under the FLSA applies here because
immigration detainees are housed by the government
and do not require the minimum wage to bring up their
standard of living.25
Judge Kane also indicated that the CDOL:
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1589).
Id.
22
See Order Denying Motion to Dismiss at 14, Menocal v. The GEO Group, Inc., 320 F.R.D.
258 (D. Colo. 2014) [hereinafter Order Denying Motion to Dismiss] (stating that the judge
granted in part and denied in part GEO’s motion to dismiss).
23
Id. (citing 7 COLO. CODE REGS. § 103-1:2 (2017)).
24
Id. at 3.
25
Id.
20
21
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[h]as found that the CMWO’s definition of ‘employee’
should not apply to prisoners. In addition, because
immigration detainees, like prisoners, do not use their
wages to provide for themselves, the purpose of the
CMWO are not served by including them in the definition
of employee. [] Finally, the Fifth Circuit has held that
immigration detainees are not employees under the
FLSA’s similar broad definition (‘any individual
employed by an employer’) because the congressional
motive for enacting the FLSA, like the CMWO, was to
protect the ‘standard of living’ and ‘general well-being’ of
the worker in American industry.”26
The order finds that the CMWO applies to all businesses offering
services to the public, but also notes that the CMWO does not apply to
state hospitals, according to CDOL Advisory Bulletin 24(I), adding that
the Aurora detention center’s medical facility was more similar to a staterun hospital than a private business offering healthcare services to the
public at large.27 Judge Kane also observed that the CMWO applies to
“Retail and Service” employers and consumers, and that the
GEO/government relation does not fit this definition.28
IV. TVPA
Judge Kane’s order recognized that the TVPA provides a civil cause
of action against anyone who “knowingly provides or obtains the labor or
services of a person by . . . means of force, threats of force, physical
restraint, or threats of physical restraint.”29 The order highlighted the
defendants’ reliance on the holding in United States v. Kozminski, which
interprets the TVPA to prohibit only “physical or legal, as opposed to
psychological, coercion.”30 The court also rejected the inferences the
defendants drew from Channer v. Hall, a decision, which the court
understood to hold that threats of solitary confinement used to compel an
Id. at 3–4 (citing Alvarado, 902 F. 2d at 396 (internal citation omitted)).
Id. at 5.
28
See id. at 5–6 (explaining that CMWO covers retail and services employees and that the
plaintiffs do not qualify as either).
29
Id. at 8 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) (2016)).
30
See Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1132 (D. Colo. 2015). See also
United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 2754 (1988) (a family running dairy farm was not
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1584 when it procured work by making threats of two cognitively
disabled men and discouraged them from leaving because the “reach [of 18 U.S.C. § 1584]
should be limited to cases involving the compulsion of services by the use or threatened use
of physical or legal coercion”).
26
27
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immigration detainee to perform kitchen work does not constitute a
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against involuntary
servitude.31 Judge Kane distinguished the language of “involuntary
servitude” at issue in Kozminski and Channer (originating in the TVPA at
18 USC § 1584 and in the Thirteenth Amendment, respectively) from the
more inclusive language of § 1589, which refers to “whoever . . . obtains
the labor or services of a person by . . . threats of physical restraint.” 32 The
order found that the language of § 1589 is intentionally broader than the
passages interpreted in Kozminski and Channer. The order also noted that
GEO failed to cite any authority supporting their claim that a “civic duty
exception” should be read into the language of § 1589, nor that this
exception should be applied to a for-profit prison company doing contract
work for the government.33
V. UNJUST ENRICHMENT
The court noted that the elements of the unjust enrichment claim track
those of the claim under the CMWO, which was dismissed.34 Nonetheless,
the order found that the plaintiffs’ claim under the CMWO was distinct
from their common-law unjust enrichment claim.35 The remedies sought
under the two legal theories were different, even though both claims
alleged that GEO failed to pay fair-market wages.36 “Unjust enrichment”
includes profits from practices that may not violate the CMWO but are
nonetheless illegal under Colorado common law.37
The basis for the potentially higher unjust enrichment claims is the
Service Contract Act (SCA), which obligates firms performing work under
contract with the federal government to pay “prevailing wages” for

31
See Menocal, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 1132. See also Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214, 219 (5th Cir.
1997) (holding “that the federal government is entitled to require a communal contribution
by an INS detainee in the form of housekeeping tasks, and that Channer's kitchen service,
for which he was paid, did not violate the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of
involuntary servitude”).
32
See Menocal, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 1133.
33
Id. at 1132–33.
34
See id. at 1133 (explaining that the unjust enrichment claim is based on the CMWO claim
and thus a legal remedy is available to the plaintiffs).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
See id. (“proper measure of unjust enrichment is difference between consideration paid
and fair market value of employee's services” (citing Growth Fund Sponsors, Inc., 904 P.2d
1381, 1387 (Colo. App. 1995))). See also Edwards v. ZeniMax Media Inc. No. 12-cv-00411, 2013
WL 5420933, *10 (D. Colo. Sept. 27, 2013) (“denying motion to dismiss unjust enrichment
claim as duplicative where remedies sought were different”).
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specified occupations.38 All of these are at levels considerably higher than
the minimum wage.39 GEO claimed that undocumented immigrants are
not eligible for protections under the SCA.40 The judge’s order, however,
affirmed the plaintiffs’ claim that the SCA mandates the contractor (or
subcontractor) to provide fringe benefits beyond those mandated by the
state or federal minimum wage laws. 41
The order rejected GEO’s claim that the plaintiffs’ suit must be thrown
out under the “government contractor defense,” since, GEO asserted, the
dollar-per-day voluntary detainee work program was established at the
behest of the federal government. 42 The court dismissed these arguments,
and found that the contract between GEO and the federal government
only establishes guidelines for reimbursement under the Detainee Work
Program, and indeed:
does not prohibit Defendant from paying detainees in
excess of $1/day in order to comply with Colorado labor
laws. In fact, the contract specifically contemplates that
the Defendant will perform under the contract in
accordance with ‘[a]pplicable federal, state and local
labor laws and codes’; and the contract is subject to the
SCA . . . .43
Based on this logic, Judge Kane rejected GEO’s attempts to skirt their legal
duties under the labor laws in force in Colorado. 44
A. Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider
Less than a month after Judge Kane issued an order refusing to
dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against GEO under the TVPA and Colorado
common law, GEO’s attorneys made the unusual move of asking the court

See Menocal, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 1133 (conveying the applicability of the SCA to
contracts).
39
See id. at 1134 (describing the added provisions that give contracted employees wage
security).
40
See id. (explaining that the defendants utilized the contractor’s defense against the
plaintiff).
41
See id. (relying and state and federal minimum wage laws). See also American Waste
Removal Co. v. Donovan, 748 F.2d 1406, 1410 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that the SCA “is also
intended to protect service contract competitors from unfair competition by employers
paying subminimum wages”).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1135.
44
Id.
38
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to reconsider its judgment. 45 The defendant’s motion asserted that GEO
“does not ‘traffic’ anyone,” and admonished Judge Kane for his
interpretation of the TVPA, which defendants claimed “should be rejected
as ‘absurd,’ as that term is understood under well-established rules of
statutory construction.”46 The defendant criticized the judge for not
satisfactorily explaining why Congress might have intended the
protections of the TVPA to extend to victims of forced labor working for
private contractors of the U.S. government. 47 The defendant’s motion
acknowledged Judge Kane’s reliance on the plain language of the TVPA,
which does not refer to any exceptions to its prohibition against forced
labor, although GEO argued that the court erred by hewing so closely to
the plain text of the act instead of adopting the defendant’s understanding
of the “clear statutory statements of Congressional intent and legislative
history undermining this expansive reading of Section 1589.”48 And GEO
faulted Judge Kane for not defending his choice of the plain-text canon of
statutory construction.49
The first part of the defendant’s argument in the motion to reconsider
was divided into two parts, the first of which argued that Judge Kane’s
interpretation of the TVPA violated the “absurdity” doctrine, 50 and the
second of which argued that a “civic duty exception” should be read into
the text of the TVPA.51 GEO also argued that Judge Kane was wrong to
place the burden of proving the applicability of a “civic duty exception”
on the defendant, claiming that the plaintiffs should have to bear the
burden of demonstrating why the exception did not apply.52 The
defendant concluded the first part of its argument by complaining that
Judge Kane’s refusal to throw out the charges against them amounted to
the creation of a new statutory cause of action for damages to be brought
by detainees against private detention facilities.53

45
Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Geo Group, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss at
2, Menocal v. Geo Group, Inc., No. 14-CV-02887-JLK (Aug. 4, 2015).
46
Id.
47
Id. at 6–9.
48
Id. at 6.
49
Id. at 6–9.
50
Id. at 10.
51
Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Geo Group, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss at
17–20, Menocal, No. 14-CV-02887-JLK.
52
Id. at 20 (“in determining whether federal statute created an enforceable right under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff bore burden to show that judicially-made exceptions did not apply”).
See, e.g., Lochman v. County of Charlevoix, 94 F.3d 248, 251 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that to
determine whether federal statute created an enforceable right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
plaintiff bears the burden to show that judicially-made exceptions do not apply).
53
Id. at 23.
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GEO’s second argument against the judge’s order alleged an
inconsistency between the judge’s finding that the individuals detained
were not employees under Colorado law, on the one hand, with his
finding that GEO may have been unjustly enriched, on the other. 54 GEO
argued that, since the detainees had no subjective reasonable expectations
of minimum wage protections, they were therefore not entitled to expect
compensation under the SCA.55
B. Motion to Strike Defendant’s Motion For Reconsideration, Document 31,
filed 8/4/2015
In responding to the defendant’s “Motion to Reconsider,” the
plaintiffs argued that they were not legally compelled to respond to the
argument point by point, since the defendant’s motion was procedurally
improper and brought without reference to any federal rule allowing such
a motion under the circumstances.56 The plaintiffs also indicated that the
defendant waived any arguments that were not brought in its prior
Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P.)
12(g)(2), and that, as a result, GEO could not initiate new legal arguments
in the Motion to Reconsider.57 While a motion to reconsider may be
permissible in cases where the law has suddenly shifted or where new
facts have come to light, the plaintiffs claimed that the only change in
circumstances that took place between the defendant’s initial Motion to
Dismiss and the subsequent Motion to Reconsider is that GEO hired new
lawyers, who felt trapped by the failure of their predecessors to raise
certain arguments in the initial motion and who simply wanted another,
improper “bite at the apple.”58
C. Order Denying GEO’s Motion to Reconsider, Document 33, filed 9/22/2015
Judge Kane, in the Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider,
pointed out that the defendant provided no evidence of any change in law
or new evidence, which might have served as the legal basis to grant a

Id. at 25.
Id.
56
See Mot. to Strike Def’s. Mot. for Recons. of Order Den. GEO Group, Inc.’s Mot. to
Dismiss at 2, Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc., 113 F. Supp.3d 1125 (D. Colo. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv02887-JLK).
57
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(g)(2) (“a party that makes a motion under this rule must not make
another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection that was available to the party
but omitted from its earlier motion.”).
58
See Mot. to Strike Def’s. Mot. for Recons. of Order Den. GEO Group, Inc.’s Mot. to
Dismiss at 2, Menocal, 113 F. Supp.3d 1125 (No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK).
54
55
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motion to reconsider.59 Indeed, as the court noted, the defendant’s motion
emphasized that the interpretation of the TVPA at issue in the case “is an
issue of ‘first impression,’” which is to say, clearly not an area where a
recent doctrinal shift has occurred.60 Judge Kane also noted that GEO
impermissibly introduced a new argument against the unjust-enrichment
finding, which had already been waived by counsel’s failure to bring the
argument in its previous Motion to Dismiss, as outlined in Fed. R. Civ.
P.12(h)(1).61
D. Motion for Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(3) And Appointment of
Class Counsel
Under Rule 23(g), Document 49, filed 6/6/2015
The motion noted that the charges Judge Kane had allowed to proceed
(the TVPA and unjust-enrichment claims) applied to practices through the
“entire facility” that used “only one non-detainee janitor on the payroll.”62
In the motion, counsel for the class of Aurora-facility detainees who
brought suit argued “[t]hey are GEO’s captive workforce.”63
The Motion for Class Certification referenced information obtained
during discovery.64 The motion noted that GEO’s policy of requiring
“comprehensive cleaning of this cell and common space . . . falls outside
of ICE’s Performance Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS),
which limits the scope of uncompensated detainee housekeeping.” 65 This
motion also reported that this policy has applied to an estimated fifty to
sixty thousand detainees based on GEO’s own records.66 The motion
indicated that the “Detainee Handbook Local Supplement . . . informs
detainees that failure to perform housing unit sanitation work is a 300level ‘High Moderate’ disciplinary offense, which could subject detainees
to up to 72 hours in disciplinary segregation (also known as solitary
confinement) or even to criminal prosecution.”67
59
Order on Mot. for Reconsideration at 2, Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc., 113 F. Supp.3d
1125 (D. Colo. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK).
60
Id. at 2 (citing defendant’s Motion to Reconsider).
61
See id. (stating that the unjust enrichment claim is dismissed because it was not
anticipated).
62
See Motion for Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(3) and Appointment of Class
Counsel Under Rule 23(g) at 3, Menocal v. Geo Grp, Inc., 320 F.R.D. 258 (D. Colo. 2017) (No.
1:14-cv-02887-JLK) (expressing that the detainee workers, now plaintiffs, were subjected to
forced labor and only one worker was on the payroll).
63
Id.
64
See id. at 2 (articulating that during the discovery process the defendant’s counsel failed
to make certain documents confidential that should have been confidential because it was
mandated by the protective order).
65
Id. at 4.
66
Id. at 6.
67
Id.
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In addition to the forced-work policy, plaintiffs also highlighted the
commonalities among those GEO paid one dollar a day through the
“Voluntary Work Program.”68 The complaint pointed out that “[a]ll
participants received uniform job descriptions, common to all participants
in their job class,” and “executed a standardized Detainee Voluntary Work
Program Agreement.”69 The crux of the charge was that “GEO misled
VWP participants regarding the possibility that they could negotiate for
higher wages.” 70 It informed the detainees that
“[t]he pricing is approved by ICE. GEO does not set the
pricing. ICE tells us what the daily pay is . . . .” [However,
t]hese representations [are] false. In reality, the PBNDS
ICE publishes sets a floor, rather than a ceiling, and
requires only that “[t]he compensation is at least $1.00
(USD) per day.”71
After tying the features of the program to the legal standards
established for class certification, the Motion for Class Certification noted
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g) and requested that the judge appoint the current
plaintiffs’ counsel as attorneys for the class: “[c]ollectively they have
invested significant time in identifying and investigating potential claims
in this action . . . [m]oreover, the varied litigation experience of the team
will be beneficial to the classes’ pursuit of the claims here.”72
E. Opposition to the Motion for Class Certification, Document 51, filed
6/1/2016.
GEO’s brief scoffed at what it characterized as plaintiffs’ “inventing a
so-called ‘Forced Labor Policy,’ gratuitously invoking images of the
‘master’s whip,’ ‘slave-like conditions,’ and a ‘captive workforce’ that is
‘expolit[ed], conscripted, coerced, and under paid.’”73 The motion
repeated prior claims that the case lacked precedent for class

See Motion for Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(3) and Appointment of Class
Counsel Under Rule 23(g) at 4, Menocal, 320 F.R.D. 258 (No: 1:14-cv-02887-JLK) (comparing
the one-dollar-per-day pay that the Volunteer Work Program participants receive with the
lack of pay that GEO gives its detainees).
69
Id. at 8.
70
Id. at 9.
71
See id. (emphasis added).
72
Id. at 24.
73
Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Class Certification at 9, Menocal v. GEO Corp.,
No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK (D. Colo. June 6, 2016).
68
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certification.74 Much of the defendant’s motion reviewed the lawfulness
of the program and did not speak directly to the plaintiffs’ Motion for
Class Certification by explaining why, having been availed of a remedy if
plaintiffs could prove two charges, the attorneys should not also be able
to represent a broader class that was allegedly subjected to similar
violations.75 For instance, the first heading of GEO’s motion stated, “The
Requirement That Detainees Perform Housekeeping Chores Is Lawful”
and the second heading stated, “The $1.00 Per Day Allowance Under the
Federally-Authorized VWP Is Lawful.”76
The defendant claimed that plaintiffs did not meet the “numerosity”
requirement because they had not proven there were more than forty
members who were putative class members.77 The defendants argued that
the “commonality” criterion was not met because GEO listed a number of
other sanctions alternative to solitary confinement, but then made the
“implausible assumption that each and every putative class member
(assuming each detainee reviewed his or her ICE Aurora Handbook),
reached the conclusion that ‘[r]efusal to clean [their] assigned living area,’
will be penalized by ‘[d]isciplinary segregation’ in a manner that violates
Section 1589.”78
GEO similarly claimed that the plaintiffs should not be allowed to
have a class certified for the charge of unjust enrichment because they
provided no “basis for how to assess whether this purported
misrepresentation led to an unjust benefit retained by GEO [in] any
particular instance.”79
In refuting the third prong necessary for class certification,
“typicality,” the defendant asserted that only one of the named plaintiffs
had submitted a declaration affirming that he had asked for higher pay or
that GEO was prevented from paying him more due to ICE instructions. 80

74
See id. at 16 (detailing the four elements to meet class certifications: (1) the class must
be large; (2) question of law is similar for the whole class; (3) claims and defenses are the
same; and (4) representatives of the class will protect the interests of the entire class).
75
See id. at 15 (showing that the motion discusses Rule 23’s requirements and furthers the
elements of this rule).
76
Id. at 3, 7.
77
See id. at 18 (purporting to show that the plaintiffs did not put forth evidence to prove
that the numerosity requirement had been satisfied).
78
Id. at 21.
79
Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Class Certification at 25, Menocal, No. 1:14-cv02887-JLK (D. Colo. June 6, 2016).
80
Id. at 29–30.
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Order Granting Motion For Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(3)and
Appointment of Class Counsel Under Rule 23(g), Document 49, filed
02/27/2017

Judge Kane granted the Motion for Class Certification. 81 The order
stated that a class would be appropriate even though the issues in the case
are new and complex.82 Judge Kane set forth his standard for class
certification as one that “requires predominance of questions of law or fact
common to the class and superiority of the class action method.”83 He thus
noted that GEO’s “most compelling, but ultimately unconvincing,
argument was that elements of both claims necessitate inquiries specific
to each class member.”84 Kane distinguished the GEO case from Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, a precedent that appeared frequently in the
defendant’s motion.85 The Wal-Mart case depended on finding that
supervisors nationwide were all discriminating against female employees
in a similar fashion. 86 Judge Kane’s order stated that:
Unlike in Wal-Mart, GEO has a specific, uniformly
applicable Sanitation Policy that is the subject of
Representatives’ TVPA claim. This Policy is the glue that
holds the allegations of the Representatives and putative
class members together . . . creating a number of crucial
questions with common answers. For example: Does
GEO employ a Sanitation Policy that constitutes
improper means of coercion under the forced labor
statute?87
Judge Kane rejected GEO’s point that “no Representative was actually
disciplined with segregation” by pointing out that “the forced labor
statute includes threats, schemes, plans, and patterns as improper means
of coercion.”88 Kane also rejects plaintiffs’ proposal to substitute “a
81
See Order Granting Motion for Class Certification under Rule 23(b)(3); Appointment of
Class Counsel under Rule 23(g) at 1, Menocal v. GEO Corp., No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK (D.Colo.
Feb. 27, 2017) (granting the motion for class certification and appointment of class counsel).
82
Id. at 2.
83
Id. at 5.
84
Id. at 6.
85
See id. at 8–9 (distinguishing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) from
the current litigation).
86
See Order Granting Motion for Class Certification under Rule 23(b)(3); Appointment of
Class Counsel under Rule 23(g) at 8, Menocal, No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK (discussing the
reasoning the Supreme Court set forth in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. when analyzing whether
female employees seeking management positions were discriminated against).
87
Id. (footnote omitted).
88
Id. at 9.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol52/iss2/4

Stevens: One Dollar Per Day: A Note on Recent Forced Labor and Dollar-Per-

2018]

One Dollar Per Day

357

reasonable person standard” for specific findings of subjective fear
inducing compliance with the guards’ orders in all cases.89 Instead, he
found that:
the ‘by means of’ element can be satisfied by inferring
from classwide proof that the putative class members
labored because of GEO’s improper means of coercion.
Representatives are correct that there is nothing
preventing such an inference. I have not found and GEO
has not provided any authority requiring that, for TVPA
claims, causation must be proven by direct and not
circumstantial evidence. Where a jury decided the
individual merits of Representatives claims, it surely
would be permitted to make such an inference.90
In other words, the plaintiffs only needed to prove that GEO used
impermissible threats to induce labor, not that any particular detainee
acted on the basis of these threats.91
Kane rejected GEO’s claim that the damages differed among putative
class members, pointing out that as long as the mechanism producing the
damages was similar across members, it would be possible to assess the
damages separately once GEO was found liable. 92
Perhaps Judge Kane’s most important defense of the decision to
certify the class was his policy analysis finding that class action lawsuits
are designed to support the weak in their efforts to challenge those with
more money and power:
In including Rule 23(b)(3), ‘the Advisory Committee had
dominantly in mind vindication of ‘the rights of groups
of people who individually would be without effective
strength to bring their opponents into court at all.’ . . . In
this case, the putative class members reside in countries
around the world, lack English proficiency, and have
little knowledge of the legal system in the United States.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 13.
91
See id. (explaining that plaintiffs must only show that GEO used impermissible threats,
not that any detainee actually acted in response to the threats).
92
Order Granting Motion for Class Certification under Rule 23(b)(3); Appointment of
Class Counsel under Rule 23(g) at 14, Menocal, No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK.
89
90
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It is unlikely that they would individually bring these
innovative claims against GEO.93
Turning to the unjust enrichment claims, Judge Kane again explained
his legal finding of commonality hung on whether GEO’s
“misrepresentation contributes to the context of GEO’s enrichment,” and
not on the subjective impressions among those who agree to work for one
dollar per day.94 He also rejected that the “unjust” element of GEO’s
enrichment requires individual-level determinations.95 Judge Kane found
that “GEO ‘has failed to explain why it would be equitable for it to retain
[the benefit conferred by] some of the putative class members, but
inequitable to retain [the benefit] from others.’”96 Judge Kane then
distinguished the facts in the GEO case from those in the precedent GEO
cited, stating that, in unjust enrichment claims, “common question will
rarely, if ever, predominate.”97 Kane pointed out that Friedman addressed
whether each employee in 2.58 million personal unscripted transactions
behaved in a similar fashion.98 “Here, there is a consistent policy under
which detained individuals worked and were paid the same amount.” 99
Kane’s order concluded by appointing as counsel to the class the attorneys
representing the nine plaintiffs.100 “Representatives’ counsel . . . have
uniquely relevant experience with the client base and with bringing
complex claims against detention facilities.”101
G. The GEO Group, Inc.’s Petition for Permission to Appeal Class, Appellate
Case: 17:701, #01019778492, filed 03/13/2017
The motion emphasized the “two novel theories” in the case:
(1) Does a contractor operating a detention facility for the
federal government compel ‘forced labor’ in violation of
a federal human trafficking statute by requiring detainees
to periodically perform housekeeping chores, when the
contractor and its housekeeping policies are subject to
Id. at 15 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 17.
95
Id. at 17–18 (discussing why the element of “unjust” should not be subject to individual
determinations of fact).
96
Id. at 18.
97
See id. (citing Freidman v. Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group, Inc., 304 F.R.D. 601 (D.
Colo. 2015)).
98
Id. (noting the problem with trying to use individual determinations to resolve the
problems of a large class of persons).
99
Id. at 19.
100
Id. at 20–21.
101
Id. at 20.
93
94
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extensive
federal
contractual
and
regulatory
requirements as well as direct federal supervision, and
the housekeeping policy is both longstanding and
judicially-accepted?;
and
(2) Is the contractor ‘unjustly enriched,’ and required to
pay restitution for the detainees’ participation in a
federally-created, sponsored and supervised voluntary
work program, when the settled expectation for decades
has been that participants are provided a daily allowance
of $1?102
GEO went on to acknowledge that the district court rejected GEO’s
request for an interlocutory appeal.103 Nonetheless, the two questions
GEO put before the appellate court were not questions about the adequacy
of the class, but objections that went to the merits of the legal charges
themselves.104
GEO objected to the judge’s order certifying the class because:
Unjust enrichment claims under Colorado law turn on the
“reasonable expectations” of the parties . . . The district
court failed to require any evidence that a single
detainee—much less a class—reasonably expected to
receive more than the $1 daily VWP allowance. [GEO
pled for review by noting that the] “class action lawsuit
for monetary relief . . . puts GEO in an acutely
problematic and intolerable position of carrying out
federal government directives while facing potentially
massive financial harm for doing so.105
The arguments here tracked those in their original motion to deny class
certification.106 GEO asserted that “the novel and indeterminate nature of
the Plaintiffs’ claims creates an insurmountable barrier to class

Petition for Appellant to Appeal Class Certification at 1, Menocal v. GEO Grp., (D. Colo.
2017) (No. 01019778492).
103
Id. at 2.
104
See id. at 2–3 (analyzing whether the charges levied in this case were reasonable).
105
Petition for Appellant to Appeal Class Certification at 3–4, Menocal, (D. Colo. 2017) (No.
01019778492).
106
See Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Class Certification, Menocal v. GEO Corp.,
No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK (D. Colo. June 6, 2016).
102
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certification.”107 GEO repeatedly emphasized that the novelty of the
claims and the allegation that Congress did not intend to prohibit their use
of detainee labor in the fashion plaintiffs alleged means that the appellate
court should deny certification. 108 GEO again cited precedents requiring
a purposive interpretation of law and not a plain reading of the text. 109
The appellee brief asserted that the plaintiffs’ use of a human-trafficking
statute to seek damages for janitorial tasks “renders the TVPA absurd and
makes certification of a class based on it impossible.”110
Engaging with the text of Judge Kane’s order, the appellees
challenged the standard he used to infer the causal link between the
conditions of their custody and the likelihood they would:
work for reasons other than GEO’s improper means of
coercion. . . . Rather than demanding proof that the
proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation . . . the district court
posited an unsupported social-psychological profile of
the ‘climate’ of detention. . . .111
The brief challenged the unjust enrichment charge for the same reasons as
previously laid out.112 The specific attack on Judge Kane’s order
emphasized the variation in their conditions and asserted that the court
should have demanded that the plaintiffs provide a damages model. 113

Petition for Appellant to Appeal Class Certification at 9, Menocal v. GEO Grp., (D. Colo.
2017) (No. 01019778492) (citing Gene & Gene LLC v. BioPay LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 326 (5th
Cir.2008).
108
See id. at 11 (presenting an explanation as to why the appellate court should deny
certification).
109
See id. at 10–11 (examining why a purposive reading of the text should be used rather
than looking at the plain meaning). See also United States v. American Trucking Ass’n, Inc.,
310 U.S. 534, 553 (1940) (holding that the commission has no jurisdiction to regulate the
qualifications or hours of service of others); Rector, etc., of Holy Trinity Church v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457, 517 (1892) (stating that the language within the statute did not reflect the
legislative intent of the act); United States v. Black, 773 F.3d 1113, 1117 (10th Cir. 2014)
(resembling a similar holding to the cases discussed above); In re Busetta, 314 B.R. 218, 227–
28 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004) (recognizing Holy Trinity’s doctrine).
110
Petition for Appellant to Appeal Class Certification at 13, Menocal, (D. Colo. 2017) (No.
01019778492).
111
Id. at 16 (internal citations omitted).
112
See id. at 19–20 (explaining how the unjust enrichment charge was attacked). See also
Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 320 F.R.D. 258, 269 (D. Colo. 2017) (furthering GEO’s argument
related to the classification of the representatives).
113
Petition for Appellant to Appeal Class Certification at 22, Menocal, (D. Colo. 2017) (No.
01019778492).
107
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The brief concluded with policy arguments tied to whether GEO
would be forced to “‘resolve the case based on considerations
independent of the merits,’ such as by settlement.”114 GEO stated:
[T]he district court’s novel certification of a class
comprising all people detained at the Facility over the
past ten years poses a potentially catastrophic risk to
GEO’s ability to honor its contracts with the federal
government . . . . And the skeleton of this suit could
potentially be refiled against privately operated facilities
across the United States, causing GEO and other
contractors to defend them even though GEO firmly
believes that policies give the Plaintiffs no legal claim. 115
H. Grant of Petitioner’s Appeal, #01019793218, filed 04/11//2017
On April 11, 2017, the court granted the petitioner’s appeal: “Upon
consideration of the Petition, the response, the reply, and the materials on
file, we note both the complexity and difficulty of the issues presented,
and we grant the Petition.”116
I.

Appellees/Plaintiffs Reply Brief, Case 17-1125, Doc 01019851249, filed
08/04/2017.

The appellees’ reply brief repeated the arguments on which plaintiffs
relied in the district court case. It also provided specific examples of forced
labor.117 For instance, the motion stated:
During his detention, Valerga performed work cleaning
the private and common living areas, when selected for
the cleaning crew by the guards, for no pay because ‘it
was well known that those who refused to do that work
for free were put in ‘the hole’—or solitary
confinement.’. . . A guard once threatened Valerga with
being put in the hole when he protested cleaning for
free . . . . Valerga also worked under the VWP from
approximately October 2013 to June 2014, both working
Id.
Id. at 23 (footnote omitted).
116
The GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal, No. 17-701 (10th Cir. Apr. 11, 2017) (order granting
petition for permission to appeal class certification).
117
See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 8–11, Menocal v. The GEO Group, Inc., No. 17-1125
(10th Cir. Sept. 27, 2017) (providing various examples of the plaintiffs’ experiences with
forced labor).
114
115
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in the kitchen and stripping and waxing floors for 7–8
hours per day, five days per week. . . . Valerga received
$1 per day under the VWP regardless of the hours he
worked.118
The appellees noted the deference the 10th Circuit affords district court
judges in granting certification: “Recognizing the considerable discretion
the district court enjoys in this area,” the Court “defer[s] to the district
court’s certification if it applies the proper Rule 23 standard and its
‘decision falls within the bounds of rationally available choices given the
facts and law involved in the matter at hand.’”119
The brief also challenged GEO’s “backdoor attack on the merits and
purported novelty of plaintiffs’ claims.”120 The plaintiffs argued that,
although they believed they would win at trial, this question is not the
appropriate inquiry during the appeal.121
In response to the argument that the invocation of TVPA is more
broad than Congress intended, the appellees cited United States v.
Kaufman, which held that the TVPA’s protections are broad enough “to
combat severe forms of worker exploitation that do not rise to the level of
involuntary servitude.”122 The motion noted that GEO’s arguments
against class certification hang on fact-based allegations that require
review by a jury:
By asserting that ‘no detainee was likely to have a
reasonable expectation of an allowance in excess of the
$1.00 daily amount’ . . . GEO identifies another issue
susceptible to class-wide proof: whether Plaintiffs must
prove that they had a reasonable expectation of receiving
in excess of $1 per day to prevail on this claim. 123
The brief explored Kozminski at length and quoted from Justice Brennan’s
concurring opinion:
It is of course not easy to articulate when a person’s
actions are ‘involuntary.’ In some minimalist sense the
laborer always has a choice no matter what the threat: the
laborer can choose to work, or take a beating; work, or go
118
119
120
121
122
123

Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 22 (citing 546 F.3d 1242, 1261 (10th Cir. 2008)).
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 24, Menocal, No. 17-1125.
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to jail. We can all agree that these choices are so
illegitimate that any decision to work is ‘involuntary.’124
To GEO’s objection that class certification is inappropriate for ascertaining
alleged subjective fears—each individual might respond differently—the
appellees noted how circumstantial evidence could be used:
An individual detainee could rely on circumstantial
evidence, including GEO’s clearly stated policies
containing threats of discipline, to persuade a jury that
she labored because of the threat of what would happen
to her if she did not. She would not need to provide direct
and individualized evidence of her mental state. 125
The appellees rejected the objection to the difficulty of assessing
classwide damages and referenced a number of precedents and models
for calculating these.126 The appellees also rejected the argument that the
unjust-enrichment claims could not be pursued on a classwide basis by
distinguishing the precedents involving a range of individualized
business transactions with GEO’s single policy applied across the facility:
“[t]he VWP was a uniform policy whose terms were non-negotiable.”127
The brief concluded by refuting the relevance of the Alvarado Guevara case
GEO cited: “[t]hat case involved Fair Labor Standards Act and
constitutional claims against a purported government employer, and
therefore did not address the applicability of Colorado’s unjust
enrichment law to detainee labor for a private company, or the superiority
of the class action mechanism to adjudicate the same.” 128
J.

Reply Brief for Appellant, filed 09/01/2017

The Reply offered a table with direct quotations from Judge Kane’s
order justifying the generalizability of the claims on the left column and
GEO’s empirical allegations refuting these on the right, for example:
uniformly applicable Sanitation Policy . . . is the glue that
holds the allegations . . . together. There is no single,
uniformly applied ‘Sanitation Policy’ that threatens
detainees with serious harm for failing to help clean.
Id. at 33 (quoting United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 959 (1988)).
Id. at 36.
126
See id. at 41–42 (supporting the notion that assessing classwide damages can be
determined through various methods).
127
Id. at 50.
128
Id. at 52, n.12.
124
125
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There is a housekeeping policy, and there is a flexible
discipline policy administered in various ways.129
GEO also noted that the threats to induce work vary and not all are
coercive: “Even if, as Plaintiffs have claimed, the ‘choice between solitary
confinement and work is no choice at all,’ surely the choice between losing
movie privileges and work is a choice.”130 GEO also argued that the
plaintiffs did not provide specific statements from GEO guards that would
induce those in GEO’s custody to believe their labor was being coerced:
These claims, even if true, provide no basis for a classwide
inference that GEO coerced the labor of every, or even
most of the detainees who have been housed at the
Facility over the past decade. Who told Plaintiffs they
would be sent to “the hole”? Were the speakers GEO
officers or other detainees?131
VI. SYLVESTER OWINO AND JONATHAN GOMEZ ET AL. V. CORECIVIC, CASE NO.
3:17-CV-01112-JLS-NLS
A. Complaint, Document 1, filed 05/31/2017
Sylvester Owino and Jonathan Gomez are plaintiffs for a class action
lawsuit against CoreCivic (formerly “Corrections Corporation of
America” or CCA).132 Some of the Owino allegations tracked those in the
Menocal lawsuit.133 Others were specific to claims viable under California
law.134 Of special note is that the class was not just those held in CCA’s
Otay Mesa facility, which held the named plaintiffs, but two much larger
classes: (1) all those who had been in CCA’s custody under immigration
laws since November 2, 2004, and forced to work; and (2) all those in
California who had been in CCA’s custody since November 2, 2004, and
forced to work.135 Whereas the Menocal suit stated three causes of action,
Reply Brief for Appellant at 6–8, Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc., No. 17-1125 (10th Cir.
Sept. 1, 2017).
130
Id. at 14.
131
Id. at 19.
132
See Complaint at 1, Owino v. CoreCivic, No. 3:17-cv-01112-JLS-NLS (S.D. Cal. May 31,
2017) (stating the parties to the action: Owino and others of that class, and CoreCivic).
133
Compare id. 1–2, 22 (showing the similar causes of action, including human trafficking
and minimum wage laws) with Motion for Class Certification of Petitioner at 1, Menocal v.
Geo Group, No.14-cv-02887-JLK (D. Colo. Feb. 27, 2017) (indicating the same causes of action
for trafficking and wage laws).
134
See Complaint at 9, 28, Owino, No. 3:17-cv-01112-JLS-NLS (noting the causes of action
that fall specifically under California law).
135
See id. at 9 (defining the forced labor class under federal law).
129
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Owino alleged twelve.136 The specific causes of action cited were: the
TVPA; the California Trafficking Victims Protection Act; California’s
Unfair Competition Law; Failure to Pay Minimum Wage; Failure to Pay
Overtime Wages; Failure to Provide Mandated Meal Periods; Failure to
Provide Mandated Rest Periods; Failure to Furnish Timely and Accurate
Wage
Statements;
Failure
to
Pay
Compensation
Upon
Termination/Waiting Time Penalties; Imposition of Unlawful Terms and
Conditions of Employment; Negligence; Unjust Enrichment.137
The Complaint referenced CCA’s policies, but provided no specific
examples of actions by CCA in violation of the laws cited. 138 In addition
to seeking damages, the plaintiffs were also seeking to enjoin CCA from
continuing its illegal practices, including using forced labor by “coercing
Plaintiffs and the Class Members to perform labor and services under
threat of confinement, physical restraint, substantial and sustained
restriction, and solitary confinement.”139
B. Motion to Dismiss, Document 18, filed 08/11/2017
In addition to legal analysis tracking that of GEO’s motions to dismiss
the Menocal suit, CCA also argued that “the facts plaintiffs allege are
insufficient to support a claim.”140 The defendant added that a California
law cannot be used to challenge programs connected to immigration
policy, which is “exclusively a federal function.” 141 CCA also claimed that

136
Compare Motion for Class Certification of Petitioner at 1, Menocal, No.14-cv-02887-JLK
(discussing the three causes of action in the Menocal case) with Complaint at 12–32, Owino,
No. 3:17-cv-01112-JLS-NLS (presenting the twelve causes of action brought in the Owino
case).
137
See Complaint at 13, Owino, No. 3:17-cv-01112-JLS-NLS (noting the first cause of action,
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act); id. at 16 (the second cause of action is the Trafficking
of Victims Protection Act under California law); id. at 21 (the third cause of action is Violation
of California’s Unfair Competition Law); id. at 22 (the fourth cause of action is Failure to Pay
Minimum Wage); id. at 23 (the fifth cause of action is Failure to Pay Overtime Wages); id. at
24 (the sixth cause of action is the failure to provide mandated meal periods); id. at 25 (the
seventh cause of action requires CoreCivic to give rest periods); id.( the eighth cause of action
is the requirement to furnish wages); id. at 27 (the ninth cause of action is based on the Failure
to Pay Compensation Upon Termination/Waiting Time Penalties); id. at 28 (the tenth cause
of action bars imposing unlawful conditions on employees); id. (the eleventh cause of action
is for negligence on behalf of plaintiffs individually and as a class); id. at 32 (the twelfth cause
of action is for unjust enrichment).
138
See, e.g., id. at 13 (complaining that the policies of CoreCivic harmed employees, but
failing to list or explain any specific policies enacted by CoreCivic).
139
Id. at 19.
140
Motion to Dismiss for Respondent at 10, Owino, No. 3:17-cv-01112-JLS-NLS.
141
Id. at 13.
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immigration detainees do not qualify as “employees” under the labor laws
of California.142
C. Response to Motion to Dismiss, Document 22, 08/31/2017
The motion stated that its references to CCA’s policies are adequate to
meet the standards of Iqbal and Twombly, and also provided a lengthy
refutation of CCA’s defense based on Alvarado Guevara, in particular
noting that the case rested on an appropriations bill from 1978 and that
the ceiling of one dollar per day does not appear in the authorizing statute
of 8 U.S.C. § 1555(d):
If the shoe were on the other foot, if Congress limited the
alien allowance portion of the $266,450,000 appropriation
to $500 per day, would it be a reasonable interpretation
that Defendant is required to pay that much? Hardly.
What it would mean is that out of the $266M
appropriation, not more than $500 per day could be
allocated for an alien’s allowance.143
D. Order by Judge Janis Sammartino, Document 25, filed 09/07/2017
On her own motion, Judge Sammartino ordered she would rule on the
motions without oral argument.144
VII. STATE OF WASHINGTON V. THE GEO GROUP, INC.
On September 20, 2017, the Attorney General, on behalf of the State of
Washington, sued GEO in Washington State’s Superior Court for Pierce
County.145 This was the first lawsuit alleging unjust enrichment and
minimum-wage law violations brought by a state government against a
Id. at 17.
Response to Motion to Dismiss for Petitioner at 2, Owino v. CoreCivic, No. 3:17-cv01112-JLS-NLS (S.D. Cal. August 31, 2017) (stating the Twombly and Iqbal standard that
complaints must be facially plausible); id. at 23 (discussing the significance of 8 U.S.C. §
1555(d) in relation to the defendant’s argument).
144
See Order Vacating Hearing at 1, Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 17-CV-1112 JLS (NLS)
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2017), EFC No. 18 (noting that the court decided on the matter without the
necessary oral arguments).
145
See Complaint at 1, State of Wash. v. The GEO Group, Inc., No. 17-2-11422-2 (P.C. Wash.
Sept. 20, 2017). See also AG Ferguson Sues Operator of the Northwest Detention Center for Wage
Violations, WASH. ST. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. (Sept. 20, 2017), http://www.atg.wa.gov/news
/news-releases/ag-ferguson-sues-operator-northwest-detention-center-wage-violations
[https://perma.cc/3JH4-2FGK] (stating that on September 20, 2017, the Attorney General
for the state of Washington sued GEO Group because GEO Group deprived their workers
the appropriate wage for their services).
142
143
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private prison firm.146 The six-page complaint began by highlighting the
“[d]efendant’s longstanding failure to adequately pay immigration
detainees for their work at the privately owned and operated Northwest
Detention Center (NWDC).”147
The complaint alleged that GEO is an “employer” and the detainees
are “employees” under the minimum-wage laws of Washington.148 It
further alleged that GEO has garnered the benefits of paying subminimum wages to its captive workers to perform necessary tasks since
2005.149
The first charge the plaintiff alleged referenced Washington’s
minimum wage law:
RCW 49.46.020 requires every employer to pay the hourly
minimum wage “to 6 each of his or her employees” who
is covered by Washington’s minimum wage laws.
Detainees work for Defendant and perform many of the
functions necessary to keep NWDC operational including
preparing and serving food to detainees, cleaning
common areas, and operating the laundry. 150
For the charge of unjust enrichment, the complaint states: “Defendant
benefits by retaining the difference between the $1 per day that it pays
detainees and the fair wage that it should pay for work performed at
NWDC.”151 It is unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit gained from
its practice of failing to pay adequate compensation to detainees for the
work they perform at NWDC.152 The complaint sought to have the court
find that the detainees are “employees” and GEO at the Northwest
Detention Center an “employer” under Washington law, and to declare
that the NWDC must comply with the state’s minimum wage law and
“disgorge the amounts it has been unjustly enriched.” 153

146
See AG Ferguson Sues Operator of the Northwest Detention Center for Wage Violations, supra
note 145 (discussing how the lawsuit, whose claims assert that GEO Group violated the state
of Washington’s minimum wage laws and unjustly enriched the corporation, is unique in
the sense that it was brought to the court by an Attorney General).
147
Complaint at 1, The GEO Group, Inc. (No. 17-2-11422-2).
148
Id. at 4.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 5.
151
Id.
152
See id. (stating that it is unfair for the GEO corporation to financially benefit from work
performed by NWDC inmates).
153
See id. at 6 (arguing that the corporation should be subject to the state’s minimum wage
laws because it is an employer and the prisoners are technically employees).
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VIII. CHAO CHEN V. THE GEO GROUP, INC.
On September 26, 2017, Chao Chen was named as the lead plaintiff in
a class-action lawsuit also against GEO’s NWDC.154 The lawsuit alleged
only violations of Colorado’s Minimum Wage Order and did not allege
unjust enrichment.155 GEO’s Motion to Dismiss, filed on October 9, 2017
claimed, among other arguments, that Washington’s minimum wage law
was preempted by federal immigration policy.156 GEO argued that a
“detainee” status under immigration law preempted claims based on an
employer-employee relationship. The motion also cited Alvarado and
drew upon the reasoning in the Menocal case, dismissing the claims made
based on the Colorado MWO.157 On December 6, 2017, Judge Bryan
denied GEO’s motion and, for the first time greenlighted the claims based
on minimum-wage violations.158 His order characterized GEO’s motion
as a “hodgepodge of federal statutes” and declined to follow the FLSA
analysis in Alvarado, Whyte, and Menocal: “[I]n this Court’s view,
extending the logic of Alvarado to interpret this State’s statutory exception
to include federal detainees moves beyond interpretation to
legislation.”159 Remarkably, GEO filed not only an answer, but also
counterclaims against Chao Chen charging him with unjust enrichment in
The points in support of the
an amount exceeding $75,000.160
counterclaims recite the elements of the GEO work program and state that
“GEO provides basic necessities to all detainees,” with no explanation as
to why that obligates Chao Chen to pay GEO.161
IX. RAUL NOVOA ET AL. V. THE GEO GROUP, INC., CASE NO: 5:17-CV-02514
Raul Novoa, a detainee at the Adelanto facility in California, filed a
complaint against GEO on December 20, 2017, on behalf of himself and

154
See Class Action Complaint for Damages at 1, Chao Chen v. The GEO Group, Inc., No.
3:17-cv-05769 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 26, 2017) (designating Mr. Chen as the lead plaintiff in the
class-action lawsuit).
155
See id. (stating that the class-action lawsuit focuses on violations of the state’s minimum
wage act as opposed to the corporation unjustly enriching itself through the prisoners’ labor).
156
See GEO’s Motion to Dismiss Class Action Complaint for Damages, Chao Chen v. The
GEO Group, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-05769 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 9, 2017).
157
Id. at 25–26.
158
See Order on Defendant The GEO Group, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Class Action
Complaint for Damages, Chao Chen v. the GEO Group, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-05769 (W.D. Wash.
Dec. 6, 2017).
159
Id. at p. 14.
160
See GEO’s Answer and Counterclaims, Chao Chen v. The GEO Group, Inc., No. 3:17cv-05769 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 20, 2017) at p. 8.
161
Id. at 8–9.
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others in his class.162 The lawsuit points out that an immigrant rights
group called Adelanto the “‘deadliest detention center’” and that GEO
withholds “sufficient food, water, and hygiene products” to force
detainees to work so that they may purchase these necessary items from
GEO.163 Novoa, a legal permanent resident who earns $15.65/hour as a
construction worker and has lived in Los Angeles since age four, has been
released from Adelanto since 2015.164 The lawsuit is demanding not only
damages for violating California’s minimum wage law, unjust enrichment
under California common law, California’s unfair competition law,
California’s Trafficking Victims Protection Act, and the federal statute
prohibiting attempted forced labor (18 U.S.C. § 1594(a)) but also injunctive
relief for the latter.165
X. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is to summarize key legal strategies being
used in new class-action litigation on behalf of those alleged to be noncitizens—the putative classes also include U.S. citizens—and who perform
work for private prison firms while in their custody for de minimis or no
pay.166 However, this research prompted me to notice a discrepancy
between GEO’s claims about the impact of the litigation on its business in
its appellate brief and its disclosures to its shareholders that merits
discussion.167 GEO’s March 13, 2017, petition with the Tenth Circuit made
the apoplectic assertion that allowing the Aurora class-action lawsuit to
proceed would jeopardize all of GEO’s ICE contracts:
[T]he district court’s novel certification of a class
comprising all people detained at the Facility over the
past ten years poses a potentially catastrophic risk to GEO’s
ability to honor its contracts with the federal government. And
the skeleton of this suit could potentially be refiled
against privately operated facilities across the United
States, causing GEO and other contractors to defend them
162
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, Raul Novoa v. The
GEO Group, Inc., No. 5:17-cv-02514 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017).
163
Id. at 7.
164
Id. at 9.
165
Id. at 12, 14, 15.
166
See Stevens, supra note 5, at 401–02 (discussing the first class-action lawsuit brought
against a global prison for failing to pay the federally-mandated wage for employment).
167
See The GEO Group, Inc.’s Petition for Permission to Appeal Class Certification at 1,
Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-02887 (D. Colo. Mar. 13, 2017) (asking the court to
look at the district court’s class certification because of the legal issues that arise from the
ruling).
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even though GEO firmly believes that policies give the
Plaintiffs no legal claim.168
And yet, for the period ending June 30, 2017, the company filed a public
report with the Security and Exchange Commission representing the
impact on GEO from the Aurora litigation as benign:
The plaintiffs seek actual damages, compensatory
damages, exemplary damages, punitive damages,
restitution, attorneys’ fees and costs, and such other relief
as the Court may deem proper. The Company intends to
take all necessary steps to vigorously defend itself and
has consistently refuted the allegations and claims in the
lawsuit. The Company has not recorded an accrual relating to
this matter at this time, as a loss is not considered probable nor
reasonably estimable at this state of the lawsuit. If the Company
had to change the level of compensation under the voluntary
work program, or to substitute employee work for voluntary
work, this could increase costs of operating these facilities.169
GEO is telling its shareholders that a loss “could increase costs,” not that
it would be unable to fill its contracts.170 The two very different scenarios
portrayed within months means that GEO is misleading either the Tenth
Circuit or the investing public.171 Furthermore, both of these
representations are presumably produced by or under the supervision of
GEO’s Office of General Counsel.172 Insofar as these are both statements
produced by attorneys representing the firm who are focused on the
impact of this litigation, it would appear these statements are deliberate.
If this is the case, GEO could be subject to shareholder lawsuits based on

Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
The GEO Group, Inc., Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 to 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 10-Q), (June 30, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/923796/000119312517249967/d423976d10q.htm
[https://perma.cc/YA8N-DKHG]
(emphasis added).
170
See The GEO Group, Inc.’s Petition for Permission to Appeal Class Certification at 26,
Menocal v. GEO Grp., No. 1:14-cv-02887 (D. Colo. Mar. 13, 2017) (discussing that the
company does not expect any litigation to have a negative impact on their financial
condition).
171
See id. at 23 (arguing that a class action lawsuit would jeopardize GEO’s contracts and
contending that a class action lawsuit would not jeopardize GEO’s contracts).
172
See id. (noting both statements made by GEO attorneys).
168
169
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the misrepresentation of the firm’s financial exposure due to the Menocal
lawsuits.173

173
Cf. id. (stating that the district court’s holding poses a problem for GEO to honor
contracts); Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 320 F.R.D. 258, 261 (D. Colo. 2017) (granting GEO’s
motion to dismiss the Colorado minimum wage claim).
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